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THE SIREN SONG OF
LITIGATION FUNDING
J.B. Heaton*
For an investor, litigation funding is too tempting to resist.  Litigation 
funding promises that most elusive of investment returns: those uncorrelated 
with an investor’s other investment returns.  Litigation funding also invests in 
a world that seems fraught with possible pricing inefficiencies.  It seems 
plausible—even likely—that a team of smart lawyer-underwriters can identify 
high-value litigation investments to generate superior returns for litigation-
funding investors.  But more than a decade of experience suggests the promise 
of litigation funding is a siren song.  The promise draws investors into the 
water, but the payoffs may be meager and rare.  While litigation funding has 
always been controversial with defendants and business trade associations, the 
real problem is that the investment class is a poor one.  First, high-stakes civil 
litigation is far more complex and random than most investors understand.  
There are an overwhelming number of ways that litigants can lose and far 
fewer paths to significant victories.  Second, few good cases—from an 
investment perspective—are likely to find their way to funders.  Third, 
litigation funding is probably prone to optimism bias, causing litigation 
funders to overestimate the probability of victory in their cases.  Finally, 
litigation funding is fungible with little value added by the funder, suggesting 
that competition will drive down any significant previously-existing profits.  
While litigation funding serves a valuable social purpose when it finances 
meritorious cases that otherwise would not be pursued, we can expect investor 
success in the field to be rare and likely limited to those funders with the most 
litigation savvy and the best luck.  Nevertheless, investors are unlikely to give 
up on the space despite the large prospect of poor returns.
* J.B. Heaton, P.C., Chicago, Illinois, jb@jbheaton.com.  Many thanks to a litigation 
funder and hedge fund manager, who will remain anonymous, for help in understanding the pitfalls 
of the litigation funding business.  Thanks also to Ronen Avraham, Tony Sebok, and Steve Shavell 
for helpful comments.  Additional thanks to my former colleagues at Bartlit Beck LLP for almost 
two decades of lessons in the conduct and uncertainties of civil litigation.  All errors are my own.
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Alas
it is a boring song
but it works every time.
- Margaret Atwood, Siren Song (1974).
I. INTRODUCTION
No aspect of litigation is more controversial than litigation funding.1
Litigation funding is the non-recourse financing of a party’s litigation expenses 
by a third-party funder.  A Law360 poll found that while 86% of attorneys who 
have used litigation funding report a positive opinion of it, 62% of in-house 
counsel—perhaps more likely to be on the other side of a funded case—report a 
negative opinion.2 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce remains actively opposed 
to litigation funding, favoring state legislative efforts to force plaintiffs to 
disclose their litigation funding arrangements as part of initial discovery 
1. In this Comment, I analyze so-called “commercial litigation finance,” the financing of 
non-consumer litigation. The financing of consumer litigation presents different issues than those 
analyzed here. For a thorough treatment of consumer litigation finance with empirical results, see 
Ronen Avraham and Anthony J. Sebok, An Empirical Investigation of Third Party Consumer 
Litigation Funding, 104 Cornell L. Rev. 1133 (2019).
2. Cristina Violante, What Your Colleagues Think of Litigation Finance, LAW360 (Dec. 11, 
2017, 9:45 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/989204/what-your-colleagues-think-of-litigation-
finance.
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disclosures in a case.3 Some judges require plaintiffs to disclose their litigation 
funding arrangements to the court.4
We think of the litigation funding arrangement as solving two problems.  
First, litigation funding is a form of financing.  Like a contingency-fee 
arrangement, the litigation funding arrangement provides financing that may 
allow a budget-constrained plaintiff to finance litigation that she would 
otherwise be unable to pursue.5 It may also allow a plaintiff that is not budget 
constrained to finance litigation without tapping other available cash, using that 
cash for other purposes.6 Second, litigation funding is a risk-transfer 
mechanism.  The non-recourse nature of most litigation funding allows the 
litigant to protect the downside of a loss by trading to the funder more of the 
potential gains from a win.
While much has been written about litigation funding,7 research has more or 
less assumed that litigation funding makes sense for investors, focusing instead 
3. See Third Party Litigation Funding (TPLF), INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM,
https://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/issues/third-party-litigation-funding (last visited Sept. 15, 
2019) (“The practice, while lucrative for those betting on cases, increases the probability that 
meritless claims will be brought, inserts questions about who is actually controlling the litigation 
other than the plaintiff and defendant, and makes settling lawsuits far more difficult and expensive.  
Even the funders admit they deliberately complicate litigation.”); Andrew Strickler, Legal Funders, 
US Chamber Weigh In on NYC Bar Study, LAW360 (June 4, 2019, 9:50 PM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1165924/legal-funders-us-chamber-weigh-in-on-nyc-bar-study.
4. See Jeff Overley, Opioid MDL Attys Must Disclose Outside Funding, Judge Says,
LAW360 (May 7, 2018, 8:56 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1041305/opioid-mdl-attys-
must-disclose-outside-funding-judge-says (reporting on an order by U.S. District Court Judge Aaron 
Polster requiring plaintiffs’ attorneys to disclose litigation funding arrangements to the court); 
Andrew Strickler, 3rd-Party Funders Must Be Disclosed in 6 Fed.  Appeals Courts, LAW360 (Mar. 
27, 2018, 8:30 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1026646/3rd-party-funders-must-be-
disclosed-in-6-fed-appeals-courts (reporting that six U.S.  federal appeals courts require some 
disclosure of litigation funders in civil disputes, while 24 U.S. district courts have a requirement that 
funders be disclosed to the court); e.g., FastShip, LLC v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 700, 717 
(2019) (“Like the patent system as a whole, litigation financing agreements can occasionally be 
susceptible to abuse . . . . But the possibility of abuse does not mean the entire system should be 
discarded.  Instead, courts have focused on the disclosure of such agreements to encourage 
transparency . . . .”).
5. See, e.g., Shayna Posses, Woodsford Litigation Funding Launches Tel Aviv Office,
LAW360 (Mar. 28, 2019, 1:17 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1142363/woodsford-
litigation-funding-launches-tel-aviv-office (quoting funder’s chief executive officer as stating: 
“[Israel] has a high volume of [venture capital]-backed, high-tech startups that are rich in 
intellectual property but limited financial resources.  These businesses often find themselves in 
dispute with U.S. and European giants, for example patent or trade secrets disputes.”).
6. E.g., Caroline Simson, 3rd-Party Funding Now a Top Alternative Choice for Lawyers,
LAW360 (May 16, 2019, 7:24 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1160547/3rd-party-funding-
now-a-top-alternative-choice-for-lawyers (“Funding is also being used by commercial parties that 
have the funds to pay for arbitration or litigation but would like to save their capital for other 
uses.”).
7. An early article is George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: 
How Much Justice Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805 (2001).  The literature is now large.  
See, e.g., David S.  Abrams and Daniel L. Chen, A Market for Justice: A First Empirical Look at 
Third Party Litigation Funding, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 1075 (2013); Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation 
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on the social benefits and costs of investor funding.  This Article argues that the 
assumption that litigation funding is an attractive investment class is wrong.  
Recent short-seller criticisms of one of the largest litigation funders have 
focused attention on whether the investment success by existing litigation 
funding firms are is as good as claimed.8 I argue here that the promise of 
litigation funding is a siren song, luring investors with promises that few other 
investment products can make.  The promise draws investors into the water, so 
to speak, but the ultimate payoffs are meagre and rare.  Thus, while litigation 
funding has always been controversial with defendants and their trade 
associations, the real problem is that the investment class is a poor one.
Part I explains the allure of litigation funding from an investor’s
perspective.  It introduces some basic investment theory and explains the 
difficulty of earning superior risk-adjusted returns in an efficient market.
Part II explains why the assumption that litigation funding is an attractive 
investment opportunity is largely incorrect.  While the headlines seem filled
with stories of enormous judgments and settlements and total legal spending is 
in the many billions of dollars, more than a decade of experience with litigation 
funding suggests that its investment promise is an empty one.  First, litigation is 
far more complex and random than most investors understand.  Second, only a 
small subset of meritorious litigation is likely to present itself to funders.  Third, 
litigation funding is probably prone to optimism bias, causing litigation funders 
to overestimate the probability of victory in their cases.  Finally, litigation 
funding is fungible with little value added by the funder, suggesting that 
competition will drive down any significant profits that have existed in the 
business previously.
Part III explores the consequences of what will likely be the poor 
performance of litigation funding.  There is good reason to believe that some 
litigation funding is socially beneficial because it allows risk-averse plaintiffs to 
pursue meritorious cases they would otherwise forego because of their risk 
aversion or inability to fund the litigation.  Litigation funding is especially 
important in allowing meritorious cases to move forward when litigants are 
otherwise unable to bear the costs and the risks of vindicating their rights.  This 
is especially true against large corporations that have the ability to outspend 
even wealthy individuals.  If litigation funding ultimately proves itself to be a 
Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65 (2010); Jonathan T.  Molot, 
The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 IND. L.J. 171 (2014); Douglas R. Richmond, Other 
People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56 MERCER L. REV. 649 (2005); Anthony J. 
Sebok, The Inauthentic Claim, 64 VAND. L. REV. 61 (2011); Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This 
Anyway? Third-Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1268 (2011); Maya Steinitz, The 
Litigation Finance Contract, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 455 (2012); Maya Steinitz, How Much Is 
That Lawsuit in the Window? Pricing Legal Claims, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1889 (2013).
8. See Margot Patrick, Short-Seller Accuses Litigation-Finance Firm Burford Capital of 
‘Meaningless Metrics,’ WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:51 AM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/muddy-waters-claim-sees-shares-in-litigation-finance-firm-tumble-11565178688?mod=
searchresults&page=1&pos=7.
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poor investment class, will litigants be unable to pursue these meritorious 
cases?
The poor performance of litigation funding is unlikely to keep investors 
away.  Financial economists are coming to understand more and more that 
investors value lottery-like payoffs more than standard models of risk averse 
economic agents would suggest.  Thus, while a majority of publicly traded 
common stocks earn less than the one-month Treasury bill rate over their lives, 
investors still flock to invest in stocks in the apparent belief that their stock 
picks will be the ones to do well.  Some funders will—by dint of substantial 
litigation savvy combined with luck—do well in the space, so there will likely 
always be funds available to finance litigation with high potential payoffs to the 
funder.  Thus, as in other areas of investment, investor irrationality or lottery-
like preferences (or irrationality that results in lottery-like preferences) will 
likely continue to make funding available, generating social benefits for 
litigants while laying off the private costs of sub-par investment performance on 
the litigation funder’s investors.
II. THE PROMISE OF INVESTING IN LITIGATION
A. Low Correlation with Other Investment Returns
Portfolio theory teaches that diversification can maintain the expected 
return of a portfolio while also reducing its risk.9 The key insight of portfolio 
theory is that the risk of any single investment in an investor’s portfolio is 
determined almost entirely by its covariance with the returns of other 
investments in the portfolio rather than the variance of its own returns.10
Covariance is simply a measure of the tendency of variables to move together or 
not.  A portfolio benefits when an asset’s returns have low covariances with 
other investment returns because the asset’s returns are not high when the other 
returns are high or low when the returns are low.  Low covariances tend to force 
the likely portfolio to return toward its expected value, reducing dispersion 
around that expected value.  Put simply, low covariances can make it more 
likely that the expected return—or something close to it—is the actual return 
earned by the portfolio.  The covariance of two variables divided by the product 
of the standard deviations of those variables is the familiar “correlation 
coefficient,” a number between -1 (perfect negative correlation) and +1 (perfect 
positive correlation).  A correlation of 0 reflects no linear relationship between 
the two variables.  When investment returns have a high positive correlation, 
they tend to move in the same direction and the same time.  Consider an 
investor who holds Microsoft and Amazon.com stock.  The correlation of the 
9. See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952); A.D. Roy, Safety First 
and the Holding of Assets, 20 ECONOMETRICA 431 (1952).
10. Id.
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daily returns on those stocks over the last two years is about 0.76 as of August 
16, 2019.11 This means that Microsoft offers only limited diversification to a 
position in Amazon.com, and vice versa.  This is fine when returns are good, 
but troublesome when returns are bad.
Covariance underlies all modern asset pricing models, including the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model, known as the CAPM (pronounced “cap M”).12 In the 
CAPM, risk is measured by “Beta,” which is the covariance of the returns of an 
asset with the return on the market of all assets, divided by the variance of the 
market return.  Securities that have returns that tend to be high when market 
returns are high—that is, those with large positive covariances—are riskier (in 
the sense of the CAPM) because they tend to fall when the market is falling and 
rise when the market is rising.  An investor would prefer, all else equal, to have 
returns that are high when the market return is low, because this acts as a sort of 
insurance policy that pays off when money is otherwise tight because market 
returns are low.  For institutional investors and very wealthy individuals, 
investments that are uncorrelated with other returns are especially valuable.  In
the world of institutional investment and high-net worth investing, low 
correlation—especially with stock market returns—is a sort of Holy Grail.
Litigation funding promises exactly this sort of low-correlation investment 
opportunity.13 The reason is easy to see.  Litigation pays off when a defendant 
pays a settlement or satisfies a judgment against it.  The timing of such 
payments has little to do with the ups and downs of the stock market.  There 
may be some correlation, of course, if a defendant is more able to satisfy a 
judgment when times in the general economy are good than when times are bad, 
but that sort of correlation is likely to be very low.  Interestingly, if litigation 
investments have zero correlation with market returns, then the proper 
benchmark rate for such investments is the risk-free rate.  This makes sense 
because such investments—in a CAPM world—have no risk that is “priced,”
that is, covariant with the market return.  Essentially, assets whose returns have 
zero correlation with an investor’s other asset returns are very valuable and do 
not require much discounting.
11. Data from Bloomberg LLP.  I obtained the prices for Amazon.com and Microsoft and 
calculate returns from August 17, 2017 to August 16, 2019.  I then calculated the correlation 
coefficient.
12. The CAPM was worked out theoretically in the early 1960s.  See William F. Sharpe, 
Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425 
(1964); John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock 
Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. STAT. 13 (1965); Jan Mossin, Equilibrium in a 
Capital Asset Market, 34 ECONOMETRICA 768 (1966); Jack L. Treynor, Toward a Theory of Market 
Value of Risky Assets, in Robert A.  Korajczyk, ASSET PRICING AND PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE
(1999) (paper circulated in the early 1960s but published only much later).
13. See, e.g., Alan Guy, 2019 Will Bring More Good News for Litigation Finance, LAW360
(Jan. 2, 2019, 3:21 PM) https://www.law360.com/articles/1114147/2019-will-bring-more-good-
news-for-litigation-finance (“Publicity regarding recent nine-figure fund raises by established 
funders and the appeal of investing in uncorrelated assets during a period of market volatility are 
likely to drive additional capital into the market in the coming year.”).
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B. Potential Market Inefficiencies
The likely low correlation of litigation funding returns with other 
investment returns would be a sufficient reason for many investors to consider 
investing, but litigation funding has another enticing promise: the prospect of 
earning superior, risk-adjusted returns by finding and exploiting mispricing.  
This is in stark contrast to the publicly traded equities market where it has 
become increasingly implausible for investment managers to beat the market 
with any reliability.  The first well-known study of the ability of professionals 
to find mispriced securities was by Alfred Cowles, published in 1933 in 
Econometrica.14  Cowles found that “the most successful records are little, if 
any, better than what might be expected to result from pure chance.”
Additional tests began in earnest in the mid-1960s.  For example, in 1966 
Professor William F.  Sharpe, who would go on to share the Nobel Prize in 
Economics for the development of the Capital Asset Pricing Model, published 
Mutual Fund Performance,15 finding support for “the view that the capital 
market is highly efficient and that good [mutual fund] managers concentrate on 
evaluating risk and providing diversification, spending little effort (and money) 
on the search for incorrectly priced securities.”16 In his 1968 study,17 Professor 
Michael C. Jensen found similar evidence.  Over subsequent decades, evidence 
has mounted against the notion that active investors beat the apparently efficient 
securities markets.  This inability of professional money managers to beat 
passive benchmarks is, for many, highly persuasive evidence of market 
efficiency in the pricing of publicly traded securities.18
Litigation investments are not subject to the same forces that drive the 
prices of most publicly traded securities to informationally-efficient levels.  
Market efficiency depends mainly on the relevant market being free and open in 
the sense that investors can buy and sell without substantial restrictions on 
participation like substantial lockups of potential sellers or bans on short selling.  
Litigation investments are not traded in such a free and open market.  Therefore, 
14. Alfred Cowles, Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast?, 1 ECONOMETRICA 309 (1933).
15. William F. Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. BUS. 119 (1966).
16. Id. at 138.
17. Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J.
FIN. 389 (1968).
18. See, e.g., Stanley J. Kon & Frank C. Jen, The Investment Performance of Mutual Funds: 
An Empirical Investigation of Timing, Selectivity, and Market Efficiency, 52 J. BUS. 263, 263 (1979) 
(observing that Jensen’s mutual fund studies “have been cited as support for the strong form of the 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH); that is, whether any investor has monopolistic access to any 
information relevant for price formation.”); Eugene F.  Fama, Two Pillars of Asset Pricing, 104 AM.
ECON. REV. 1467, 1482 (2014) (“However one judges market efficiency, it has motivated a massive 
body of empirical work that has enhanced our understanding of markets, and, like it or not, 
professional money managers have to address its challenges.”).
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litigation funders could possibly make investments that generate superior risk-
adjusted returns.19
C. Easy Money
Given the promise of litigation funding as an investment, litigation funders 
have unsurprisingly had an easy time raising money.  In 2013, one such firm 
was able to raise $300 million in less than a year.20 Two years later, the fund 
had more than $1.4 billion under management.21 By the end of that year, the 
litigation fund sold out to a large publicly traded funder, Burford Capital, for 
$160 million, or more than 10% of assets under management.22 In 2018, a start-
up litigation fund founded by a veteran of one the largest funds, Bentham IMF, 
raised $250 million.23 Another fund reported raising $125 million, which 
included “$100 million through university endowments, $50 million from the 
University of Michigan, with the rest coming from various funds and high-net-
worth individuals.”24 Harvard University’s endowment is a large investor in 
litigation funding.25
These figures suggest that the lure of litigation funding is strong.  Litigation 
funders have been able to raise funds at a time when, for example, hedge fund 
19. Burford Interim Report 2019, Burford Capital, https://www.burfordcapital.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/08/BUR-32541-Interim-Report-2019-WEB.pdf (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) 
(“It is also important to bear in mind that the complexity and illiquidity of legal finance assets is 
precisely what gives Burford its edge and its historic ability to generate desirable returns.  If 
litigation assets were easy to value, the economics of our business would be very different.”).
20. See Andrew Strickler, Attys, CFOs More Open to Litigation Finance, Survey 
Finds, LAW360 (Jan. 16, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/501563/attys-cfos-more-open-to-
litigation-finance-survey-finds (“In April, a new player in the industry, Chicago-based Gerchen 
Keller Capital LLC, announced it had raised more than $100 million in three months and was set to 
back their  first cases.  On Monday, Gerchen Keller said they had raised a second fund and had 
about $300 million under management.”).
21. See Andrew Strickler, Litigation Backer Gerchen Keller Tops $1B with New Fund,
LAW360 (Jan. 6, 2016), https://www.law360.com/articles/743219/litigation-backer-gerchen-keller-
tops-1b-with-new-fund (“The Chicago-based Gerchen Keller, which claims to be the world’s largest 
investor focused on litigation and regulatory matters, said its new fund brings its total assets under 
management north of $1.4 billion.”).
22. See Benjamin Horney, Burford’s $160M GKC Buy Creates Litigation Funding Giant,
LAW360 (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:50PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/872631/burford-s-160m-gkc-
buy-creates-litigation-funding-giant.
23. See Andrew Strickler, Litigation Funder Validity Poaches Pair from Bentham IMF, LAW 
360 (Dec. 4, 2018, 3:25 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1107944/litigation-funder-validity-
poaches-pair-from-bentham-imf (reporting on fund’s starting capital).
24. Darcy Redden, Lake Whillans Closes $125 Million Litigation Funding Round, LAW360
(Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/998726/lake-whillans-closes-125m-litigation-
funding-round.
25. See Michael McDonald, Harvard Invests in Litigation Strategy That Has Posted Big 
Gains, BLOOMBERG (June 26, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-06-
26/harvard-invests-in-litigation-strategy-that-has-posted-big-gains (describing Harvard’s investment 
in fund raises by IMF Bentham).
Fall 2019] Litigation Funding 147
managers operating in the public stock markets have been experiencing 
withdrawals and closing while new funds have difficulty raising capital.  In 
contrast, litigation funding is not yet a winner-takes-all market, at least in terms 
of fund-raising.  Investors appear to believe that the asset class is attractive and 
that there is no shortage of talent able to earn superior, risk-adjusted returns.
But there are reasons to be skeptical.
III THE PERILS OF INVESTING IN LITIGATION
A. The Complexity of High-Stakes Civil Litigation
High-stakes civil litigation can seem like a simple matter of win or lose, but
the process is extraordinarily complex.26 Economic models often present 
litigation as involving a simple comparison of the probability of a plaintiff’s 
victory as the plaintiff perceives it, Pp, the judgment that the plaintiff will win if 
victorious, J, the cost of litigation for the plaintiff, Cp,
27 the probability of a 
plaintiff’s victory as the defendant perceives it, Pd, and the cost of litigation for 
the defendant, Cd.
28 There is then a simple inequality that implies that the 
plaintiff will settle the case if:
Pp J - Cp < Pd J + Cd
That is, the case should settle if the risk neutral plaintiff’s expected gain 
from litigating is less than the risk neutral defendant’s expected loss.  Further, 
the case should settle somewhere in the range of those two amounts.  Cases 
should always settle if the parties agree on J and P, because the plaintiff’s costs 
are a reduction from her expected gain (forcing the left side of the equation 
down) and the defendant’s costs are an addition to his expected loss (forcing the 
right side of the equation up).  If the inequality is reversed:
Pp J - Cp > Pd J + Cd
then the case will go trial.
This simple model of litigation can generate a number of insights, but it is 
simplistic to the point of absurdity in light of the complexity of real-world 
litigation.  The probability of victory is not so easily determined.  The classical 
26. Surprisingly, little research addresses the problem of complexity and litigation 
prediction.  Colleen V. Chien, Predicting Patent Litigation, 90 TEX. L. REV. 283 (2011) provides an 
exception.  Some attempts to frame the problem are quite simplistic.  See, e.g., Michaela Keet, 
Litigation Risk Assessment: A Tool to Enhance Negotiation, 19 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 17 
(2017).
27. Costs include legal fees, discovery costs, trial exhibits, travel expenses, expert witness 
fees, court costs, etc., but exclude costs that are not out-of-pocket like the opportunity costs of time 
and attention given to the litigation.
28. The classical models were developed in the early 1970s.  See John P. Gould, The 
Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William R. Landes, An Economic 
Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to 
Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
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model treats the litigation outcome almost as a coin toss, with a certain 
probability P of coming up “victory” and a probability 1-P of coming up 
“defeat.” In the real world, there are a multitude of variables that make it 
difficult to estimate P.  Put differently, the decision tree for real world litigation 
is profoundly complex.
Consider a very simple case where there is a single cause of action with four 
elements that the plaintiff must establish to win her case.  One of those elements 
is the existence and amount of damages, which effectively makes for a five-
element case.  When the plaintiff files her case, she must allege each of the 
elements of her claim in satisfaction of the required pleading standard.  
Assuming that the amount of damages need not be pled, there are four elements 
that must be pled in accordance with the relevant pleading standards.  There are 
15 ways to get past this stage for the plaintiff.  First is to adequately plead each 
of the 4 elements and proceed to discovery (assuming that we are in a 
jurisdiction like the federal courts where no immediate appeal is available for 
denial of a motion to dismiss, and not in a state like New York where 
interlocutory appeals of most every ruling are available).  Second is to fail to 
plead any of the four elements (1 possibility) adequately according to the trial 
court’s decision but to obtain a full reversal of that decision on appeal.  Third is 
to fail to plead three of the four elements (4 possibilities) but to obtain a full 
reversal of that decision on appeal.  Fourth is to fail to plead two of the four 
elements (6 possibilities) but to obtain a full reversal of that decision on appeal.  
Fifth is to fail to plead one of the four elements (4 possibilities) but to obtain a 
full reversal of that decision on appeal.
Against these 15 ways to get past a motion to dismiss, there are 65 ways to 
lose.  First, the plaintiff could fail to plead any of the elements in the view of the 
trial court.  There is one way to fail to plead all the elements.  On appeal, the 
trial court could be upheld as to all the elements (1 possibility), upheld as to any 
three of the elements (4 possibilities), upheld as to any two of the elements (6 
possibilities), or upheld as to any one of the elements (4 possibilities).  There 
are then 15 ways to lose the motion to dismiss when the trial court finds no 
element to be adequately alleged.  With a trial court finding that are there three 
elements inadequately alleged, there are 28 ways to lose,29 with two elements 
inadequately alleged, there are 18 ways to lose,30 and with one element 
inadequately alleged there are 4 ways to lose: the determination as to that one 
element (of which there are four possibilities) is affirmed on appeal.  Thus, the 
motion to dismiss and possible appeal alone generates 80 possible outcomes.
29. There are 4 ways to fail to plead 3 elements at the trial court level.  For each of these, the 
appellate court can affirm on all three elements (1 possibility), affirm on two of the three elements 
(3 possibilities), or affirm on any one of the three possibilities (3 possibilities).  Thus, there are 4 x 7 
= 28 ways to lose when failing to plead three elements.
30. There are 6 ways to fail to plead 2 elements at the trial court level.  For each of these, the 
appellate court can affirm on both elements (1 possibility) or on either one of the two elements (2 
possibilities).  Thus, there are 6 x 3 = 18 ways to lose when failing to plead two elements.
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Matters get worse from there.  Once discovery begins, there are a practically 
unknowable number of ways that evidence can present itself in the form of 
documents (including emails), the deposition testimony of fact witnesses 
(parties and nonparties), and the depositions and reports of expert witnesses.31
At the onset of a case, it is essentially impossible to determine what the set of 
evidence will look like at the close of fact and expert discovery.  But that set of 
evidence largely determines the probabilities of the paths for either getting 
stopped at summary judgment32 or proceeding to trial.  Assuming we have the 
four-element claim with the amount of damages to be proven at trial, there are 
now another 80 paths, 15 of which get past summary judgment (in some cases 
after appeal), and 65 of which end the case after an unsuccessful appeal.  For 
the paths that get past summary judgment to trial, we have the same number of 
paths, but now with the added range of damages numbers that might be awarded 
by the judge or jury.  In addition, the standards of review on appeal change at 
the summary judgment and post-trial stages for some matters decided by the 
fact-finder.
Now consider that our example concerned a single cause of action with four 
elements.  Most high-stakes civil cases have multiple counts.33 Each of those 
cases has the same nature of complexity, including—perhaps most 
importantly—how discovery unfolds once the case has passed the initial 
pleading hurdles.  It is extremely difficult for even the most seasoned and 
experienced litigators to even roughly judge the chance of victory in a case.  
The probability that a litigation funder’s underwriter can do so is quite low.
B. Good Cases are Hard to Find
There are many meritorious cases in the world.  The litigation funder’s
problem is to find the subset of meritorious cases that make sense as 
investments.  That is no easy task.
First, a significant problem in litigation funding is the difficulty of scaling 
up an investment in a good case.  Litigation funders can, in some circumstances, 
buy a direct participation in a claim, but most limit their investment to funding 
the costs of litigation.  But even a large litigation can only generate so much 
expense.  A litigation funder may find a great case on the merits but must limit 
its investment to the costs of the case.  This is quite unlike the investment 
31. Some have argued that the uncertainty of what might be uncovered in discovery can 
justify even lawsuits that have a negative expected value when the case is filed.  See Joseph A. 
Grundfest & Peter H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 
STAN. L. REV. 1267, 1277 (2006).
32. We have little systematic understanding of how summary judgment works in practice 
and what factors determine outcomes.  See Jonah B. Gelbach, Rethinking Summary Judgment 
Empirics: The Life of the Parties, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1663 (2014).
33. See, e.g., Christina L. Boyd & David A. Hoffman, Litigating Toward Settlement, 29 J. L.
ECON. & ORG. 898, 899 (2013) (“A single filed complaint may advance multiple, often competing, 
theories, and causes of action.”).
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problem facing other investment managers.  An investment manager who 
decides that Google stock is a great investment can pretty much buy as much of 
that stock as she wants.  The same is true for an investment manager who wants 
to own U.S. 30-year Treasury bonds or invest in oil and gas.  Scale is not a 
problem in such investments.  The litigation funder, however, is more like a 
small-business lender.  Each case is its own small business and needs only a
certain amount of capital.
Second, not all good cases that need significant capital will present 
themselves to the litigation funder.  Litigation funding trades downside 
protection—essentially, the possibility of losing the case while having borne the 
costs of litigation—for a share of the upside in the litigation.  Because the 
funding must have a positive expected value for the litigation funder to take it, 
the funding will have a negative expected value for the plaintiff if she and the 
litigation funder agree on the merits (probability of victory) of the case.  The 
plaintiff will not take the negative expected value funding unless she is risk 
averse or budget-constrained (that is, does not have the money to fund the 
litigation herself).  Moreover, a plaintiff who is budget-constrained will take 
only the amount of financing necessary to overcome the budget constraint, 
limiting the funder’s ability to scale his investment.  If the plaintiff is optimistic 
about her case relative to the litigation funder, this will only exacerbate her 
unwillingness to accept unnecessary funding, because her optimism makes the 
funding seem even more of a bad deal than when she is not optimistic.  In other 
words, a plaintiff who sees her litigation as highly likely to prevail will be more 
reluctant to share a reward with a litigation funder.
Third, some of the cases that present themselves to the litigation funder will 
not be good cases.  Because litigation funders provide non-recourse financing, a 
plaintiff can have some upside with little or no financial downside.  A risk 
neutral plaintiff who is pessimistic relative to the litigation funder will accept 
funding even for a case that she perceives to have negative expected value.  We 
would expect funders (and investors placing money with funders) to be 
especially cautious of funding litigants who are not budget constrained and who 
are not plausibly risk averse for the amounts at stake in the investment.
C. The Problem of Optimism
Excessive optimism is a well-documented psychological bias.  People 
exhibit an optimism bias when they systematically overestimate the probability 
of a good event and underestimate the probability of a bad event.  The relevant 
psychological literature presents two pervasive findings that make optimism an 
interesting subject of study for corporate finance researchers.  First, people are 
more optimistic about outcomes they believe they can control.  Second, people 
are more optimistic about outcomes to which they are highly committed.  
Litigation funding investments are likely to evoke optimism for both of these 
reasons.
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While litigation funders may be realistic about the inherent uncertainties of 
litigation, they may still believe they have, and will continue to have, substantial 
control over the litigation.  Their investment can be contingent on the 
involvement of counsel of their choice.  While they cannot dictate strategy to 
the litigation team or make settlement decisions for the client, the possibility of 
repeat business by the funded plaintiff’s lawyers can create some pressure to 
take the funder’s view into account.  At the start of the case, the funder may 
also simply overestimate their ability to persuade the litigation team and client 
to view the case as the funder does.  Litigation funders are also likely to be 
highly committed to the outcome of the case.  Indeed, there is little else about 
the litigation funding arrangement that matters as significantly as the financial 
outcome.
Optimism is particularly problematic for litigation-funding investors 
because optimism is likely to result in a winner’s curse outcome, similar to 
bidders in corporate acquisitions.34 The winner’s curse is the tendency for the 
winner in an auction or bidding process to be the potential buyer who most 
overvalues the asset being sold.35 In this context, if several litigation funders 
evaluate a potential cases, the litigation funder that funds the case—likely the 
one who (1) agrees to fund the litigation and (2) offers the best terms to the 
plaintiff—may be the litigation funder who most overvalued the case’s
potential.  Here, the possible market inefficiencies for litigation investments can 
come back to bite the investor.  In a market for a publicly traded stock, some 
investors’ ability to sell short (that is, borrow shares they do not own, sell them, 
and hope to buy them back in the future at a lower price), can depress prices 
that have been driven too high by investor optimism.36 No such mechanism
34. See Richard Roll, The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers, 59 J. BUS. 197 (1986); 
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597 (1989); J.B. Heaton, 
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance, 31 FIN. MGMT. 33 (2002); Ulrike Malmendier & 
Geoffrey A. Tate, Who Makes Acquisitions? CEO Overconfidence and the Market’s Reaction, 89 J.
FIN. ECON. 20 (2008).
35. See E.C. Capen, R.V. Clapp & W.M. Campbell, Competitive Bidding in High-Risk
Situations, 23 J. PETROLEUM TECH. 641 (1971); Max Bazerman & William F. Samuelson, I Won the 
Auction but Don’t Want the Prize, 27 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 618 (1983); John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 
The Winner’s Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 894 
(1986).
36. The classic explanation is that “without short selling the price of a security is raised if 
there is divergence of opinion.  A sufficient amount of short selling could increase the volume of the 
security outstanding until its price was forced down to the average valuation of all investors.”
Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162 (1977).  
There is substantial evidence that short selling is important to market pricing.  See, e.g., Charles M. 
Jones & Owen A. Lamont, Short-Sale Constraints and Stock Returns, 66 J. FIN. ECON. 207 (2002); 
Karl B. Diether, Kuan-Hui Lee & Ingrid M. Werner, Short-Sale Strategies and Return 
Predictability, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (2009) (examining the extent and importance of short selling 
in U.S. stocks); Pedro A.C. Saffi & Kari Sigurdsson, Price Efficiency and Short Selling, 24 REV.
FIN. STUD. 821 (2011) (examining the same for global stocks); Ekkehart Boehmer & Juan (Julie) 
Wu, Short Selling and the Price Discovery Process, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 287 (2013) (documenting 
the greater accuracy of stock prices when short sellers are active); Mahdi Nezafat, Mark Schroder & 
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exists for litigation investments, so optimism is likely to result in a painful 
winner’s curse in some, perhaps many, litigation investments.
D. Competition Without Comparative Advantage
Notions of perfect competition are as old as the field of economics.37 In one 
modern formulation, a perfectly competitive environment is one where “there 
are perfect-substitute outside options: if a buyer or seller tries to press his 
trading partner for more favorable terms of trade, the latter has recourse to a 
perfect-substitute, alternative buyer or seller.”38 Sellers of litigation funding are 
likely to find themselves in near perfect competition with one another.  Funding 
is fungible.  With so much capital drawn into the litigation funding business and 
a limited number of good cases to choose from, litigation funders cannot hope 
(for long) to extract returns much above a perfectly competitive level.  Even if 
large existing publicly traded litigation funders are to be believed in their often-
opaque financial reporting of excellent returns from investments, those returns 
are likely to fall as funders compete with each other to put their capital to work.
The fungibility of litigation finance contrasts with, for example, private 
equity and venture capital.  Both private equity firms and venture capitalists 
have substantial control rights in the companies where they invest.39 This 
makes it possible for private equity funds and venture capitalist funds to 
distinguish themselves from competitors on dimensions other than the money 
they provide.40 Private equity managers promote their reputations for working 
well with company management.41 By contrast, litigation funders must remain 
passive.42 This passivity limits the ways that litigation funders can differentiate 
Qinghai Wang, Short-Sale Constraints, Information Acquisition, and Asset Prices, 172 J. ECON.
THEORY 273 (2017) (presenting a model that short-sales constraints during financial crises increase 
volatility and may not support prices).
37. See Joan Robinson, What is Perfect Competition?, 49 Q. J. ECON. 104 (1934).
38. Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Perfect Competition and the Creativity of the 
Market, 39 J. ECON. LITERATURE 479, 481 (2001).
39. See Paul Gompers et al., What Do Private Equity Firms Say They Do?, 121 J. FIN. ECON.
449 (2016) (describing private equity governance of their portfolio companies); Steven N. Kaplan & 
Per Strömberg, Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring, 91 AM.
ECON. REV. 426 (2001) (describing venture capitalist governance of their portfolio companies).
40. See Viral V. Acharya et al., Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from 
Private Equity, 26 REV. FIN. STUD. 368, 370 (2013) (suggesting that private equity firms differ in 
their ability to add value at portfolio companies).
41. E.g., GTCR LLC, https://www.gtcr.com/the-leaders-strategy/, (“As a leading private 
equity firm, GTCR pioneered The Leaders Strategy™—finding and partnering with management 
leaders in core domains to identify, acquire and build market-leading companies through 
transformational acquisitions and organic growth.  This differentiated approach has stood at the core 
of GTCR’s investment strategy for more than 35 years.”) (GLCR is a large Chicago-based private 
equity firm).
42. E.g., Danielle Cutrona, Answers to Key Legal Finance Ethics Questions, LAW360 (July 
16, 2019, 4:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1178103/answers-to-key-legal-finance-
ethics-questions, (“Legal finance providers enter into carefully negotiated transactions with law 
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themselves from one another other than by offering better financial terms to 
those taking litigation finance.
IV. WILL LITIGATION FUNDING SURVIVE BAD RETURNS?
The primary social benefit of litigation funding is that it allows risk-averse 
plaintiffs to pursue meritorious cases they would otherwise forego because of 
their risk aversion and/or inability to fund the litigation.  Most individuals are 
risk averse.  Risk aversion causes plaintiffs to act as if they are pessimistic 
about cases when they are not, and this can allow defendants to avoid answering 
for wrongdoing.  Like a contingency fee arrangement, a non-recourse litigation 
funding arrangement provides financing that allows a budget-constrained and/or 
risk averse plaintiff to finance litigation that she would otherwise be either 
unable or unwilling to pursue.  The non-recourse nature of most litigation-
funding allows a litigant to protect against the downside of a loss—primarily, 
the inability to recover costs—by trading to the funder a portion of the gains 
from a judgment or settlement.
Litigation funding is especially important in allowing meritorious cases to 
move forward when litigants would otherwise be unable to bear the costs and 
risks of vindicating their rights, especially against large corporations that have 
the wherewithal to greatly outspend even wealthy individuals.  If litigation 
funding ultimately proves itself to be a poor investment class, will litigants then 
be unable to pursue these meritorious cases?
There is good reason to believe that poor returns to litigation funders will 
not drive investors out of the space.  The best evidence supporting this belief 
comes from experience with active investment management in publicly traded 
stocks.  Passive index funds have long outperformed active equity managers.43
Accumulated evidence of underperformance by active managers has generated a 
massive shift to passive investing, but many investors continue to chase the 
promise that active management will outperform passive management.44  The 
firms and corporations represented by sophisticated counsel.  Their agreements should explicitly 
state that the legal financier neither controls nor will seek to control strategy, settlement or other 
litigation-related decision-making, nor direct a counterparty to settle a case at all, or for a particular 
amount.  Nor should legal finance providers withhold contractually required funding for strategic 
reasons: They are passive investors, and do not control the legal assets in which they invest.  Those 
decisions remain entirely with the client.”) Danielle Cutrona is director of global public policy for 
Burford Capital LLC.
43. See, e.g., Daisy Maxey & Chris Dieterich, Indexes Beat Stock Pickers Even Over 15 
Years, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/indexes-beat-stock-pickers-even-
over-15-years-1492039859; Chris Newlands & Madison Marriage, 99% of Actively Managed US 
Equity Funds Underperform, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content/e139d940-
977d-11e6-a1dc-bdf38d484582.
44. See, e.g., Kate Beioley, US active funds suffer record $143bn ‘exodus’ in December,
FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.ft.com/content/4b863bbe-1a7a-11e9-9e64-d150b3105d21;
Chris Flood, Vanguard Retains Title as World’s Fastest-Growing Asset Manager, FIN. TIMES, (Jan. 
4, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/4245e135-d719-311c-a9d2-d9a75ec8ac79; Attracta Mooney, 
Passive Funds Grew 4.5 Times Faster Than Active in 2016, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2017), 
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fact that so many investors continue to pursue active management in the face of 
inferior performance suggests investors might do the same in the litigation 
funding space.
In fact, not only have investors in publicly traded stocks been willing to 
stick with active equity management despite underperformance, investors 
generally have been willing to stick with stock investments despite the fact that 
only a tiny amount of stocks do better than the risk-free rate over their lives as 
listed companies.  In pathbreaking work published in 2018, finance professor 
Hendrik Bessembinder found reports that the majority of U.S.-listed common 
stocks since 1926 returned (inclusive of dividends) less than the risk-free rate 
(that is, the one-month Treasury bill) over their lives as listed companies, so that 
just 4% of listed U.S. companies account for all of the gains of the U.S. stock 
market from 1926 to 2016.45 In follow-up work in 2019, Bessembinder and his 
colleagues extended their results for 1990 to 2018 to other countries and found 
similar results: a majority of both U.S. and non-U.S. stocks underperformed the 
one-month U.S. treasury bill rate.46 Despite these facts, investors stand ready, 
willing, even eager, to invest in publicly traded stocks.
The willingness of investors to stick with active management and 
investment in individual stocks despite bad past performance suggests that 
investors will not be deterred from investing in litigation finance simply 
because returns are not as high as expected.
V. CONCLUSION
Much criticism against litigation funding—that it will lead to frivolous 
litigation47 or deprive litigants of control over their cases—is unpersuasive.  
Litigation funders must be highly selective about the cases they fund.  Litigation 
funding is nonrecourse funding (i.e., without guarantees or collateral), so 
litigation funders get paid only from recoveries in the litigation.  It is 
economically irrational for litigation funders to fund frivolous litigation.  Only 
if litigation funders work to screen out unmeritorious cases are they likely to 
earn a sufficient return on their incurred risk—losing cases typically results in a 
total loss of investment.
https://www.ft.com/content/c4f6ee56-e48c-11e6-9645-c9357a75844a; Corrie Driebusch, Investors 
Pulling More Money From Actively Managed U.S. Stock Funds, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 13, 2016), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/investors-pulling-more-money-from-actively-managed-u-s-stock-
funds-1452702638.
45. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Do Stocks Outperform Treasury Bills?, 129 J. FIN. ECON.
440, 441 (2018).
46. See Hendrik Bessembinder, Te-Feng Chen, Goeun Choi & K.C. John Wei, Do Global 
Stocks Outperform US Treasury Bills (July 5, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3415739.
47. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Litigation Finance and the Problem of Frivolous 
Litigation, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 195 (2014).
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The real criticism of litigation funding is not that it inflicts damages on the 
justice system or litigants.  It is that, for most investors, litigation funding is 
probably too good an investment to be true.  Some funders will succeed, but 
they are likely to be those founded by former litigators with true depth of 
experience, not those with limited experience in law without deep relationships 
to find and evaluate a significant deal flow of cases with a cold eye.  Most 
funders will probably deliver poor returns to their investors, and it is possible 
the returns to the industry as a whole will be negative once all currently 
committed capital has turned over.  Most investors could take a lesson from 
Odysseus. They can listen to the luring promises of low correlation and market 
inefficiencies but they should remain firmly tied to the mast of their ship, avoid 
the sirens’ temptation, and naviagte investments to safer waters.  But there is 
little reason to doubt that some will continue to fall for the siren song of 
litigation funding.  For society and the justice system, that may be a good thing.
***
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